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Abstract A new deontic logic, Action Type Deontic Logic, is presented. To motivate
this logic, a number of benchmark cases are shown, representing inferences a deontic
logic should validate. Some of the benchmark cases are singled out for further com-
ments and some formal approaches to deontic reasoning are evaluated with respect to
the benchmark cases. After that follows an informal introduction to the ideas behind
the formal semantics, focussing on the distinction between action types and action
tokens. Then the syntax and semantics of Action Type Deontic Logic is presented
and it is shown to meet the benchmarks. Finally, possibilities for further research are
indicated. In the appendix, decidability of the satisfiability of formulas is proved via
a technique known from monadic First Order Logic.
Keywords deontic logic, Ross’ paradox, free choice inferences, decidability of
satisfiability.
1 Introduction
Deontic logics aim at representing correct deontic reasoning, the inferences people
ought to make about norms, i.e. what they may, should or must do. Many deontic
logics apply deontic operators such as must and may to propositions, as in the sen-
tence, ‘It must be the case that Frank runs’, see e.g. Chellas (1980), Hilpinen (1971),
Hilpinen (1981), McNamara (2006). However, an old tradition in modern deontic
logic going back to von Wright’s first paper on the topic, applies deontic operators
to action types, as in the simpler sentence, ‘Frank must run’, see von Wright (1951).
Although deviating substantially from von Wright’s original proposal, the basic idea
of applying deontic operators to action types is maintained here. A set of acceptable
or good action tokens instantiate various action types. An action of a certain type may
be done iff there is an action token of that type. An action of a certain type must be
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done iff all action tokens are of that type. Negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions
of action types are defined inductively. The disjuncts of disjunctive action types are
non-empty in the sense that there are action tokens instantiating each disjunct in the
given situation. The aim of this paper is to show that a rather well-behaved deon-
tic logic ensues from these semantic devices. In order to operationalize this claim a
number of benchmark cases for a deontic logic will be presented, representing de-
ontic inferences speakers usually make in natural language contexts. I evaluate some
well-known deontic logics with regard to these benchmarks. After this, an ontology
of action types and action tokens is introduced informally. I then present a new formal
language and semantics, Action Type Deontic Logic, which validates inferences that
coincide with the benchmark cases. Some limitations of the logic and possibilities for
further research are discussed. Decidability of satisfiability of formulas of the logic
is shown via a variant of well-known technique from monadic First Order Logic.
2 Informal deontic reasoning
The cases to be presented below represent deontic inferences most fluent speakers
would probably accept in natural language contexts.1 The benchmark cases are di-
vided into three categories, consequences (what one should be able to infer), non-
consequences (what one should not be able to infer), and equivalences (what should
mean the same). These are presented in Figures 1, 2, 3. To the best of my knowledge,
there is no deontic logic which meets all these benchmarks, that is, validates or proves
all of the consequences, does not validate or prove any of the non-consequences and
validates or proves all of the equivalences - with the exception of the logic developed
here. Most of the examples are in the figures because they play an important role in
natural language. However, most of them are also there to highlight specific problems
encountered by one or more existing deontic logics.
Many of the inferences in the figures will be highlighted in this section and the
next. We will start with Figure 2: 1, 2, known as Ross’ paradox and introduced by
Alf Ross in Ross (1941). Informally, it is exemplified by the inference from 1. to 2.
below.
Example 1 1. ‘You must send the letter.’
2. ‘You must send the letter or burn the letter.’
In standard deontic logic (and many other deontic logics) the paradox crops up in
form of the following validity.
1 This claim is based on my own linguistic intuitions, informed by discussions with the people present
in various contexts where I have presented this work. I have, however, not tested the claim statistically,
hence the qualification ‘would probably accept.’ Since my default belief is that natural language should be
respected as far as possible, I elevate these cases to normative standards or benchmarks that a good deontic
theory should meet. Here I appeal to normal linguistic intuitions as a regulative guideline. My view is not
that a logical theory should be founded on empirical observations of natural language phenomena. On the
contrary, a good theory gives a plausible theoretical explanation of the inferences it validates. However,
a theory should provide a very good theoretical reason, if it diverges from natural language, preferably
a reason arising within the theory itself. Philosophical logicians are often too eager to sacrifice natural
language to save the logical theory they have become accustomed to working with.
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From Infer
1 You must You may run andrun or hide you may hide
2 You must You mayrun run
3 You may You may run andrun or hide you may hide
4 You may run and You mayyou may hide run or hide
5 You may You may run andrun and hide you may hide
6 You must You must run andrun and hide you must hide
7 You must run and You must run andyou must hide hide
8 You may run oryou may not run
9 It is not the case that you must runand you must not run
Fig. 1 Consequences
From Do not Infer
1 You must You must run orrun eat
2 You may You mayrun run or eat
3 You must You must run orrun or hide you must hide
4 You may run and You mayyou may hide run and hide
5 You may You mayeat or not eat run
5 You may You may eat andeat hit the waiter
Fig. 2 Non-consequences
If and only if
1 You must It is not the case that you mayrun not run
2 You may It is not the case that you mustrun not run
Fig. 3 Equivalences
©φ →©(φ ∨ψ)
In the above sentence,© is read as ‘obligatory’. The paradox has a dual twin, where
P is read as permissible’.
Pφ → P(φ ∨ψ)
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Ross’ paradox brings out differences between deontic and epistemic or alethic modal-
ities. For instance, the following justification of Ross’ paradox does not work: since
a disjunction gives less information than either disjunct it is pragmatically inappro-
priate to give a disjunctive permission, when you can give a categorial one. The fol-
lowing example emphasizes this point.
Example 2 An employer tells an employee that she may work through July. In August
he reveals that it was actually the case that she was allowed to work through July or
take a vacation. He explains that the reason he did not reveal this, is that he wanted
to give her as precise information as possible.
Clearly, the employer’s justification is not acceptable. The employer has hidden im-
portant information about his employee’s rights from her. In my view, this shows that
he has not understood the meaning of the word ‘may’. Let us continue the example
and assume that she in fact did work through July and that the employer strongly be-
lieved that this would be the case when he uttered the first permission. This belief was
based on his experience with this employee. He thus had a true justified belief that the
employee would work through July. Nonetheless, his justification is not acceptable.
It is a thesis of this paper that the reason is there are semantic peculiarities of deontic
sentences which in turn influence the basic logical inferences that can be made from
sentences containing these words, a prime example of which are free choice infer-
ences. The following is an example of a free choice inference, see also Figure 1: 1,
3.
Example 3 1. ‘You may send the letter or burn the letter.’
2. ‘You may send the letter and you may burn the letter.’
An inference of deontic logic, which is usually considered to be unproblematic is the
following, which will be referred to as ‘must implies may’, see Figure 1: 1.
Example 4 From ‘you must send the letter’ infer ‘you may send the letter.’
Or, in general, for any formula φ ,
©φ → Pφ
It is now perhaps clear how we may get problematical reasoning by combining
Ross’ paradox with the free choice inference, as sketched in the following example.
Example 5 1. ‘You must send the letter.’ (Given.)
2. ‘You must send the letter or burn the letter.’ (From 1. by Ross’ Paradox.)
3. ‘You may send the letter or burn the letter.’ (From 2. by must implies may.)
4. ‘You may send the letter and you may burn the letter.’ (From 3. by free choice
inference.)
5. ‘You may burn the letter.’ (From 4. by classical logic.)
This is clearly unacceptable. From any obligation to do something, I get the permis-
sion to do anything at all! Now, coming from classical logic, one is inclined to explain
Ross’ paradox away by denying the non-classical free choice inference. However, as
Hans Kamp pointed out already in 1973, we have a strong intuition that a disjunctive
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permission entails the permission to do either disjunct, see Kamp (1973). Reconsid-
ering the inference above with natural language as a guide, the problematic step does
not seem to be from 3. to 4., but rather from 1. to 2.. We should therefore be looking
for a logic which blocks Ross’ paradox and validates free choice inferences.
3 Formal deontic logics
The reason why Ross’ paradox crops up in standard deontic logic, indeed in any nor-
mal modal logic such as e.g. Horty’s stit logic, see Horty (2001), is that a normal
modal operator preserves logical consequences, and a disjunction follows from a cat-
egorical statement. Of course, the free choice inference is not valid in normal modal
logic, but this should be seen as a deficit. Thus any normal modal logic is disqualified
from meeting the benchmarks, and we will now look at some alternatives.
A tradition in deontic logic, which does take free choice permissions seriously
goes back to Anderson’s logic of prudence and is now known as a logic of strong
permission, see e.g. Asher and Bonevac (2005). Anderson employs the notion of
a sanction, a constant which when true at a world indicates that that world is not
morally acceptable. The idea behind the logic of prudence is to ”reverse” the modal
(box) truth condition, so that Pφ is true, if and only if, all worlds which make φ true
are acceptable. Anderson writes:
States of affairs which entail the denial of the sanction might, for example, be
regarded as prudent...
(Anderson; 1966, p. 199)
Anderson’s proposal validates free choice inferences and blocks Ross’ paradox.
However, there are obvious problems. The proposal validates the inferences Pφ →
P(φ ∧ψ) and P(φ ∨¬φ)→ Pψ , both counter-intuitive in a deontic context, see Fig-
ure 2: 5, 6. Moreover, Anderson’s strong permission fails to validate the inference
P(φ ∧ψ)→ Pφ called conjunction exploitation, see Figure 1: 5. In a way, this is
quite natural, when we think about Anderson’s original idea behind the semantics.
From ‘it is prudent to jump from a plane and wear a parachute’ it does not follow
simply that ‘it is prudent to jump from a plane’ - if you do not wear a parachute,
you might get in trouble. However, taken as a representation of permission, the pro-
posal does not capture what we normally mean by by this. For instance, the following
conjunction seems problematic.
Example 6 ‘You may invite Beth and invite Smilla, but you may not invite Beth or
you may not invite Smilla.’ (?)
How can it be that you may invite Beth and Smilla, but there is one of them you may
not invite? In other words, it seems that deontic logic should validate conjunction
exploitation. The converse, on the other hand should not hold. It does not follow,
from the fact that you may take an apple and you may take a pear, that you may take
an apple and take a pear, see Figure 2: 4.
A recent update of Anderson’s proposal fails to validate conjunction exploitation,
see Asher and Bonevac (2005). Moreover, on any such account permissions and obli-
gations fail to be duals - thus we lose the quite natural equivalences in Figure 3: 1,2.
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A lot of recent work has been given the heading dynamic deontic logic. This work
starts with Meyer (1988), and continues with e.g.van der Meyden (1996), Segerberg
(2012), see also Meyer and Veltman (2007). One source of inspiration for this work
is the following validity of propositional dynamic logic, see e.g. (Goldblatt; 1992, p.
111).
[α ∪β ]φ ↔ [α]φ ∧ [β ]φ
This is valid because the relation for the modality [α ∪ β ] is the union of the two
relations for [α] and [β ]. Since α ∪ β is read ‘do either α or β ’, it looks a lot like
a free choice inference. The sentence may be read ‘after you do either α or β , φ is
true, if and only if, after you do α , φ is true and after you do β , φ is true’. Even
though the idea behind these logics is that modal operators should be applied to ac-
tion types, Ross’ paradox is not blocked and free choice inferences are not allowed in
the first paper mentioned, Meyer (1988). I will not treat it any further here. In van der
Meyden (1996), however, Ross’ paradox is blocked and free choice inferences are
allowed. Broadly speaking, van der Meyden’s logic is in the tradition of Anderson’s
strong permission. An execution of an action is represented as a sequence of states.
An action kind or type is a set of such sequences. Some of these sequences or ex-
ecutions are green or permitted. A benefit of this framework is of course that one
may speak of sequential actions, a topic not treated in this paper. However, in other
ways the expressivity of the logic is limited. It is not clear how to talk about doing
actions of different kinds simultaneously. This problem is related to the objection to
the truth condition of the free choice permission operator stated below. A free choice
permission of an action a holds, when all executions of a are permitted. Obligation is
treated as a dual to a (traditional) weak permission, giving us some of the problems of
standard deontic logic for these operators, including Ross’ paradox. Thus, we have a
further problem of having two different kinds of permissions, without a well-founded
conceptual distinction between the two. A simple objection is that empty actions
(with no possible executions) are always permitted, but as van der Meyden points out
this can be remedied by a non-emptiness condition. However, there is a more serious
objection, which is that the universal style truth condition is too strong to model per-
mission. The problem is not so easy to detect in van der Meyden’s logic because it
is not clear how to represent simultaneous actions, or as we might say, action tokens
(sequences) instantiating several action types. Intuitively, though, an execution s is of
two types α and β if it is an element in both sets representing the types. However, if
that is a correct way of seeing it, the following problem follows.2
Example 7 There are many different ways an agent may eat a pear. With some of
these action executions the agent also kills a person, since the agent eats a pear and
kills the person at the same time. However, (we may assume) it is not permitted for
the agent to kill a person. Hence this particular action execution cannot be permitted.
According to van der Meyden’s semantics, it is not permitted for the agent to eat a
pear!
2 This objection and the following example was presented to me by Frank Veltman.
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This seems very counterintuitive, but it is a natural consequence of the require-
ment that every single execution of an action must be green, for the action to be
permitted. In view of the discussion about action tokens and action types in the fol-
lowing section, it seems ontologically correct to say that a single action token may
instantiate several action types. Further, it should be enough that some ways of per-
forming an action type is enough to say that this action type is permitted. However,
this existential nature of permission is blocked in van der Meyden’s semantics. As
van der Meyden points out, Meyer’s logics do not have this problem, as he has an
existential style truth condition for permission. However, in view of the above, it also
seems correct to keep van der Meyden’s intuition that free choice permissions should
be allowed and Ross’ paradox blocked.
A related body of work is in the tradition of dynamic epistemic logic, see van
Benthem and Liu (2007). Here the focus is on changing the preference relation be-
tween worlds dynamically with normative utterances, see also Yamada (2006). This
is again related to work on dynamics in logical linguistics, see Veltman (1996). The
focus is on the context changing potential of deontic sentences. A classic paper from
this perspective is van der Torre and Tan (1999). A recent one is Mastop (2011). How-
ever, since the focus in these papers is on performative aspects of deontic sentences,
I will not treat them further.
Finally, I mention two proposals more closely related to this paper. The first was
developed in Jackson (1985). In that paper, an action is always a member of a set of
actions, the available alternative actions. The following truth condition of ‘it ought to
be that A’ is given, where A is an action.
Definition 1 It ought to be that A out of {A,A1, . . . ,An}, iff what would be the case
were A true is better than what would be the case were Ai true, for all 1≤ i≤ n.
Jackson’s main intuition that there are a set of available action tokens some of which
are permitted is also the main intuition behind the theory presented here. The main
difference between Jackson’s approach and the one taken here, is perhaps the explicit
distinction between action types and action tokens introduced below. On Jackson’s
proposal, deontic operators are applied to action tokens, whereas they will be applied
to action types in the logic to follow.
The second proposal I mention is Zimmermann (2000). In the dynamic deontic
logics discussed above, as in dynamic logic in general, there are two symbols for
disjunction, one used between sentences and one used between actions. Thus natural
language disjunction receives two different formal representations. This is also the
approach taken in this paper. However, Zimmermann suggests that disjunction always
should be interpreted to allow the free choice inference. A disjunction is taken to be
a list of epistemic possibilities. An agent may do A1 or. . . or An, iff the agent may do
all the things on the list A1, . . . ,An.
However, Zimmermann acknowledges that the theory has a problem with deontic
must as in the following sentence.
Example 8 ‘Mr. X must take a taxi or a bus.’
The only reading his theory can get of the above implies that either Mr. X must
take a taxi or Mr. X must take a bus. But the sentence means (interpreted deontically)
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that there are two options, each permitted, and that they taken together exhaust all
acceptable possibilities. This should imply that Mr. X may do either, but not that he
must do one of them, see Figure 2: 3.
A solution to this problem is offered in Geurts (2005). However, on both Zim-
mermann’s account and Geurt’s revision of it there is no clear distinction between
factual contexts, where e.g. disjunction introduction is allowed, and contexts where
it not allowed. If we give up classical disjunction in all contexts, we lose inferences
that are both common and natural. That this is an issue is recognized by Geurts.
To conclude, none of these approaches get all the inferences in the figures right.
Although there are many other deontic logics out there, I will now examine the dis-
tinction between action tokens and action types, which is crucial for the semantics to
follow.
4 Action types and action tokens
According to von Wright norms apply to action types or as he calls them, acts, which
he takes to cover act qualifying properties.
We shall say that theft, murder smoking, etc. are acts. The individual cases
that fall under theft, murder, smoking, etc. we shall call act-individuals. It is
of acts and not of act-individuals that deontic words are predicated.
(von Wright; 1951, p. 2)
Peter Geach has criticized deontic logic from moving away from actions and
towards applying deontic operators to formulas expressing arbitrary propositions, see
Geach (1982). Stit theory is a rather successful attempt at taking Geach’s objections
seriously, see also (Horty; 2001, p. 4). However, stit theory has been criticized for not
representing actions directly.
No author in the Anselm-Kanger-Chellas line up through Belnap - Davidson
belongs to a different tradition - has countenanced the existence of actions in
logic: action talk, yes; ontology of actions, no.
(Lindstro¨m and Segerberg; 2007, p. 1199)
The authors explicitly say that this remark does not apply to Horty. However, Horty
states that there is no way of representing action types in stit theory. Thus stit theory
appears to be only suited for treating action tokens and their consequences, cf. Horty:
These actions are only action tokens, however - individual concrete actions.
There is no such thing as the action type of ”opening a window”, for example.
There are individual, concrete openings of individual windows, but nothing to
group them together.
Horty (2001)
In the philosophy of action the view of treating actions as objects is especially
associated with Donald Davidson, see Davidson (1963). As such it is sometimes con-
sidered opposed to the modal view on action and agency advocated by e.g. stit theory.
Indeed Belnap and his colleagues write,
Action Type Deontic Logic 9
We delight in the fact that stit does not treat actions primarily as “things” to
be counted or named.
(Belnap et al.; 2001, p. vi)
We have one group of philosophers claiming that actions are not to be treated as
objects and another group saying they should. In the next section I present the ideas
behind the formal logic to follow, where an attempt is made at striking a compromise
between the simple naming of action tokens in the tradition of Davidson and the
refusal to name actions at all and only talk directly about their consequences as in stit
theory.
5 The ideas behind Action Type Deontic Logic
I agree with Belnap and colleagues and with von Wright that we do not often talk
directly about action tokens, especially when it comes to future-directed sentences
such as the ones involving obligations and permissions. We do not give names to
particular instances of brushing teeth before the act, in fact this seems practically
impossible given the many possible ways someone might brush his or her teeth. On
the other hand, we talk about action types all the time, see e.g. Ross (1930), Hage
and Brouwer (2000). It is a thesis of this paper, that by doing so, we indirectly talk
about action tokens as well, we implicitly quantify over a set of action tokens. The
latter was the part missing in von Wright’s original proposal. Consider the following
informal argument. At all times you wish to perform one of the (legally or morally)
acceptable actions available to you. If one of these actions instantiates the type of,
say, eating an apple, then you may eat an apple. On the other hand, if you may eat an
apple, then there has to be an acceptable action of that type. If all of the acceptable
actions are of a certain type, e.g. of not-killing, then you must not-kill. On the other
hand, if you must not-kill, then it cannot be that there is an acceptable action of the
killing type.
In the formal semantics action tokens are seen as primitive objects, as is a set
of basic action types. Complex action types are then defined inductively. An action
token instantiates the action type not T , if and only if it does not instantiate T . Thus
your action is of the type of ‘not going to the beach’, if the action is not of the
going to the beach type. An action token may instantiate several types, e.g. the same
action token may instantiate ‘going to the beach’, ‘going for a run’, ‘getting some
exercise’, ‘meeting a friend’, and so on. Action type conjunctions are thus defined via
the various action types the action token instantiates. An action token is of the type
T and R if and only if, it is of both types. Disjunctions of action types, as conceived
here, has the feature of being non-empty. An action token is of the disjunctive action
type S or R, if and only if, first, it is of either of the types, and second, there are
action tokens instantiating both types in the situation. Non-emptiness may here be
interpreted as a criterion of relevance or availability. In order for the disjunctive type
to be instantiated, there must be tokens available instantiating each disjunct. Now
deontic operators may and must operating on action type terms to form statements
can be interpreted as follows. must[T] holds if and only if, every good action is of
type T. may[T] holds if and only if some good action is of type T.
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Let me finish this section by listing a number of idealizing assumptions which
will be made in the following. The logic to follow is restricted to one agent in one
situation. This means that multi-agent issues are sidestepped, and that sequences of
actions are not treated, i.e. the question of doing various things in a certain order
cannot be expressed. Further, the set of acceptable actions is given in this situation.
Depending on the application, this set might represent what is legally, socially, or
morally acceptable. However, this implies ignoring the question as to what makes
an action “acceptable”, i.e. whether there are universal moral truths, or moral norms
depend solely on the values of the community in which they are taken to hold. The
logic is propositional in the sense that First Order issues are not treated, e.g. the
distinction between de re and de dicto deontic statements or the question as to whether
deontic logic is extensional or intensional. Defeasibility of norms are not treated, and
normative dilemmas are not possible in the logic. The possibility of not fulfilling an
obligation is also not treated, as it is presupposed that the agent chooses an acceptable
action. I will return to some of these idealizing assumptions in the final section. The
task now will be to show that even with these restrictions, an interesting deontic logic
can be developed.
6 Logic
The Action Type Deontic Logic which will be presented is intended to represent the
deontic reasoning of a single agent in a specific situation. The idealizing assumptions
listed in the previous section will be taken to hold, and knowledge of propositional
logic and basic set theory will be assumed.
6.1 Syntax
6.1.1 Symbols
The logic is generated from the following symbols.
Definition 2 1. A countable set, BT , of basic action type symbols, BT =(T1,T2, . . .).
2. The negation, conjunction and disjunction action type operators, −, ∩, unionmulti.
3. Deontic operators, must and may.
4. A countable set, P, of propositional variables, P = (p1, p2, . . .).
5. Propositional operators, ¬, ∧, ∨,→,↔.
6. Round and square parentheses, left and right, (,), [, ].
6.1.2 Action type terms
An expression of the language is just a string of symbols. We are mainly interested
in well-formed action type terms and well-formed formulas. The set, ACT , of well-
formed action type terms is defined inductively as the smallest set satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
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Definition 3 1. For any basic action type term Ti ∈ BT , Ti ∈ ACT .
2. If T,S ∈ ACT , then −T,(T ∩S),(T unionmultiS) ∈ ACT .
6.1.3 Formulas
The set of well-formed formulas, WFF , is defined as the smallest set satisfying the
following conditions.
Definition 4 1. If T ∈ ACT , then may[T ] ∈WFF and must[T ] ∈WFF .
2. If pi ∈ P, then pi ∈WFF .
3. If φ ,ψ ∈WFF , then ¬φ ,(φ ∧ψ),(φ ∨ψ),(φ → ψ),(φ ↔ ψ) ∈WFF .
6.2 Semantics
6.2.1 Models
A model for action type deontic logic is a structure M = 〈G,V,θ〉, where G (also
written dom(M)) is a non-empty set called the domain of M. The domain G represents
the set of acceptable or good action tokens available to an agent. I will use lower
case Greek letters, α,β , . . . for members of the domain.3 θ is an interpretation of the
propositional variables assigning a truth-value t or f to each propositional variable.
V is a valuation function assigning to each basic action type term, Ti ∈ BT , a subset
of the domain, i.e. V : BT →P(G). V (T ) is the set of action tokens of that particular
type available to the agent in the situation. In order to interpret the disjunctive action
types of the form (T unionmulti S) we use the union of non-empty sets, an operation on sets
defined as follows, where K and L are sets.
Definition 5 1. T unionmultiS = T ∪S, when S 6= /0 and T 6= /0,
2. T unionmultiS = /0, when S = /0 or T = /0.
The union of non-empty sets is just ordinary union, when both sets are non-empty.
Otherwise, it is defined as the empty set.
V is extended to the entire set of well-formed action type terms as follows, where
T,S ∈ ACT . In the definiens, \ is set-theoretical complement, ∩ is set-theoretical in-
tersection, and unionmulti is the union of non-empty sets. In the definiendum they are symbols
of the formal logic.
Definition 6 1. V (−S) = G\V (S).
2. V ((T ∩S)) =V (T )∩V (S).
3. V ((T unionmultiS)) =V (T )unionmultiV (S).
3 Presumably, the agent also has available a set of actions which are not acceptable, but since we are
only concerned with idealized deontic reasoning here, we have no need to model these non-ideal actions.
It is an interesting methodological point that we can do without non-ideal actions when modeling deontic
reasoning, given the enormous effort which has been put into modeling these in the history of deontic
logic. On the other hand, the logic must be extended if we are to handle violations of obligations and
contrary-to-duty obligations.
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6.2.2 Evaluation of formulas
The truth of a formula in a model M is defined as follows, where T ∈ ACT is any
action type term, pi ∈ P is any propositional variable, and φ and ψ are any formulas.
Definition 7 1. M  may[T ] iff for some α ∈ G, α ∈V (T ).
2. M  pi iff θ(pi) = t.
3. M  ¬φ iff M 2 φ .
4. M  φ ∧ψ iff M  φ and M  ψ .
Propositional operators ∨, →, ↔ are defined as usual. We define the operator
must as ¬may[−T ]. must[T ] then gets the following derived truth condition.
Fact 1
M must[T ] iff for any α ∈ G, α ∈V (T ).
Proof Left to the reader.
Validity, satisfiability, and logical consequence are defined as follows.
Definition 8 A sentence is valid if it is true in all models. A sentence is satisfiable
if it is true in some model. We also say that a set Γ of sentences is true in a model,
denoted M  Γ , if for every φ ∈ Γ , M  φ . We say that a set of sentences Γ is
(jointly) satisfiable, if there is a model M, such that M  Γ . A sentence φ is a logical
consequence of a set of sentences Γ , if for any model M such that M  Γ , we have
M  φ .
6.3 Validities
The following validities correspond to ones presented in Figure 1. In the following,
T and S are in ACT . I have omitted outer parentheses, when this does not cause any
problems.
Proposition 1 1. must[T unionmultiS]→ (may[T ]∧may[S]).
2. must[T ]→may[T ].
3. may[T unionmultiS]→ (may[T ]∧may[S]).
4.  (may[T ]∧may[S])→may[T unionmultiS].
5. may[T ∩S]→ (may[T ]∧may[S]).
6. must[T ∩S]→ (must[T ]∧must[S]).
7.  (must[T ]∧must[S])→must[T ∩S].
8. may[T ]∨may[−T ].
9.  ¬(must[T ]∧must[−T ]).
Proof Left to the reader.
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6.4 Non-validities
The following non-validities correspond to the ones presented in Figure 2.
Proposition 2 1. 2must[T ]→must[T unionmultiS]
2. 2may[T ]→may[T unionmultiS].
3. 2must[T unionmultiS]→ (must[T ]∨must[S]).
4. 2 (may[T ]∧may[S])→may[T ∩S].
5. 2may[T unionmulti−T ]→may[S].
Proof The proof consists of a countermodel to the inferences, M. Let dom(M) =
{a,b}. Let V (T1) = {a,b},V (T2) = /0, V (T3) = {a}, V (T4) = {b}, and V (Ti) =V (T2),
for i > 4. Set θ(pi) = f for any pi ∈ P.
1.+ 2. We have M  must[T1], and M  may[T1], but neither M  must[T1 unionmultiT2], or
M  may[T1unionmultiT2].
3. We have M  must[T3unionmultiT4], but neither M  must[T3] or M  must[T4].
4. We have M  may[T3]∧may[T4], but not M  may[(T3∩T4)].
5. We have M  may[T3unionmulti¬T3], but not M  may[T2].
6.5 Equivalences
Finally, here are logical equivalences corresponding to the ones presented in Figure 3
(plus a few extra ones).
Proposition 3 1. must[T ]↔¬may[−T ].
2. may[T ]↔¬must[−T ].
3. may[T ∩S]↔may[(S∩T )].
4. may[T unionmultiS]↔may[SunionmultiT ].
5. must[T ∩S]↔must[T ∩S].
6. must[T unionmultiS]↔must[SunionmultiT ].
Proof 1. By definition of must. 2. Left to right. Assume M  may[T ] and M 2
¬must[−T ]. Then there is α ∈V (T ), but since M 2¬must[−T ] implies M must[−T ],
α ∈V (−T ), i.e. G\V (T ), contradiction.
Right to left. Assume M ¬must[−T ] and M 2may[T ]. Then M 2must[−T ]. Hence
it is not the case for every α ∈ G that α ∈ G \V (T ). Thus, for some α , α ∈ V (T ).
However, since M 2 may[T ], there is no α ∈V (T ), contradiction.
3. M may[(T ∩S)] iff there is α ∈G, s.t. α ∈V (T ) and α ∈V (S) iff there is α ∈G,
s.t. α ∈V (S) and a ∈V (T ) iff M  may[(S∩T )].
The rest of the equivalences are similar.
6.6 Decidability
It is perhaps intuitively apparent that Action Type Deontic Logic is not very expres-
sive, and hence satisfiability (and thus validity) of formulas ought to be decidable.
In particular, the deontic operators are like quantifiers and action types seem like
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monadic predicates. In fact, we can obtain the following theorem by a technique used
to establish decidability for monadic First Order Logic.
Theorem 2 Satisfiability for formulas of Action Type Deontic Logic is decidable.
Theorem 2 is proved in the appendix.
7 Limitations and further research
The must and may operators are meant to represent deontic modalities as they oc-
cur in natural language. As in von Wright’s original system (and in natural language,
except for emphasis, as in the sentence, ‘you must, must, must come tonight!’) itera-
tions of these operators are not meaningful. Sequential action types of the conditional
type, e.g. ‘first brushing your teeth, then flossing’, cannot be expressed within the se-
mantics. An obvious avenue of further research would be to extend the system to
handle sequences of actions, looking to dynamic logic and temporal logic for inspira-
tion, see e.g. van der Meyden (1996), Goldblatt (1992). In the single situation context
presented here, we can still express conditionals with propositional ‘triggers’ as in
the following example.
Example 9 1. ‘If it rains, you must use an umbrella.’ (p→must[T ])
2. ‘You must use an umbrella only if it rains.’ (must[T ]→ p)
3. ‘If you must hand in a paper, you must correct it first.’(must[H]→must[C])
4. ‘If it rains, you must not use an umbrella.’ (p→must[−T ])
5. ‘If it does not rain, it is not the case that you must use an umbrella.’(¬p→ ¬must[T ])
In the third sentence, intonation can be used to emphasize that deontic must is meant
in the antecedent ‘you must hand in a paper’. In the fourth sentence the scope of the
negation is ‘use an umbrella’, i.e. it is an internal action type negation. In the fifth
sentence the scope of the negation in the consequent is ‘you must use an umbrella’.
In many contexts, this sentence could be paraphrased ‘If it does not rain, you need
not use an umbrella’. These considerations are similar for may.
There are many interesting First Order issues in deontic logic, which cannot be
treated within the semantics thus far. It would be nice to be able to express for instance
the following.
Example 10
The Prime Minister of Denmark must be appointed by the Monarch.
However, this would require research into First Order Action Type Deontic Logic,
taking inspiration from First Order Modal Logic, see e.g. Fitting and Mendelsohn
(1998), Bra¨uner and Ghilardi (2007), Goble (1996). Another obvious limitation con-
cerns contrary-to-duty obligations, see e.g. Prior (1954), Chisholm (1964), Forrester
(1984), Prakken and Sergot (1997), and defeasible obligations. With regard to the
first, the semantics could be extended with a set of non-acceptable actions and the
valuation of action types suitably extended. This would enable us to say that an agent
has violated a norm. Another extension would be to defeasible norms, e.g. taking
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W.D. Ross’ famous theory on prima facie vs. all things considered duties as a start-
ing point, as well the work done in this area, see Ross (1930), Nute (1997), Bringsjord
and Taylor (2012). One possibility is putting a preference ordering on the action to-
kens, in order to represent a more fine-grained theory about acceptable actions, see
e.g. Horty (2001).
The logic presented does not cover the inference from ‘You may run or you may
hide’ to ‘you may hide’.4 The technical reason why it is not validated is that in this
sentence the deontic disjuncts are within the scope of a sentential disjunction which
is classical in the current system. However, I have no doubt that many people will in
fact accept this inference, which could be seen as indicating a certain spillage from
the deontic context into the surrounding sentential context. Dealing with this phe-
nomenon is beyond the scope of the present system. A solution would require that we
give up classical disjunction in further contexts than the ones within the scope of de-
ontic operators. However, I maintain that there are also purely factual contexts where
disjunction is classical and where disjunction introduction should be permitted. The
system presented here presents one compromise between these two facts, but there
are undoubtedly other ways to cut the cake and further research is required.
Finally, I mention the need to extend the logic to handle multi-agent situations.
This might enable us to shed new light on the distinction between individual agency
and group agency, see e.g. Belnap et al. (2001), Horty (2001).
Despite these limitations, Action Type Deontic Logic solves a good deal of the
problems found in the literature on deontic logic in a natural way. It is intended to
serve as a foundation for further research into extensions and applications for instance
in semantics, see e.g. Portner (2009), formal decision theory, see e.g. [reference to
author’s own work removed], machine law, see e.g. Prakken (1993), and robot ethics,
see e.g. Arkin (2009), Abney (2012), Bringsjord and Taylor (2012).
8 Appendix
I now state the definitions and lemmas needed to prove theorem 2 stating that Action
Type Deontic Logic.
Definition 9 Let M = 〈G,V,θ〉 and M′ = 〈G′,V ′,θ ′〉 be models. Define a strong ho-
momorphism from M to M′ to be a function h from dom(M) to dom(M′), such that.
1. For any pi ∈ P, θ(pi) = θ ′(pi).
2. For any Ti ∈ BT , α ∈ G (α ∈V (Ti) iff h(α) ∈V ′(Ti)).
For the following lemma to go through we need a surjective strong homomorphism.
Let M and M′ be models and h a surjective, strong homomorphism from M to M′.
Lemma 1 1. For any T ∈ ACT , α ∈ G ( α ∈V (T ) iff h(α) ∈V ′(T )).
2. For any φ ∈WFF, M  φ iff M′  φ
Part 2 of the above lemma shows that satisfiability is invariant under surjective, strong
homomorphisms.
4 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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Proof 1. We define the complexity of an action term as the number of action type
terms in the action type term. The proof is by induction on the complexity of action
terms.
1. Induction basis. Let Ti ∈ BT , α ∈ G. We have α ∈ V (Ti) iff h(α) ∈ V ′(Ti) by
definition of surjective, strong homomorphism.
2. Suppose the lemma holds for any action type term of complexity lower than n.
Now suppose T is an action type term with complexity n. The proof divides into
several cases.
(a) T is of the form −S. Left to right. If α ∈ V (−S), then α ∈ G \V (S), and so
α 6∈ V (S). Then h(α) 6∈ V ′(S) (by induction hypothesis), so h(α) ∈ V ′(−S).
Right to left. If h(α) ∈V ′(−S), then h(α) ∈ G′ \V ′(S), and so h(α) 6∈V ′(S).
Then α 6∈V (S) (by induction hypothesis), so α ∈V (−S).
(b) T is of the form (S∩R). Left to right. If α ∈ V (S∩R), then α ∈ V (S) and
α ∈ V (R). Hence, by induction hypothesis, h(α) ∈ V ′(S) and h(α) ∈ V ′(R).
Hence h(α) ∈V ′(S∩R). Right to left. If h(α) ∈V ′(S∩R), then h(α) ∈V ′(S)
and h(α) ∈V ′(R). Hence, by induction hypothesis, α ∈V (S) and α ∈V (R).
Hence α ∈V (S∩R).
(c) T is of the form (SunionmultiR). Left to right If α ∈V (SunionmultiR), then 1) α ∈V (S) or 2)
α ∈V (R). Assume 1. By induction hypothesis h(α) ∈V ′(S). Since V (R) 6= /0
by definition of unionmulti, there is β ∈V (R). By induction hypothesis h(β ) ∈V ′(R).
Hence h(α) ∈ V ′(SunionmultiR). The other case is similar. Right to left. If h(α) ∈
V (SunionmultiR), then 1) h(α) ∈ V ′(S) or 2) h(α) ∈ V ′(R). Assume 1. By induction
hypothesis α ∈ V (S). V ′(R) 6= /0 by definition of unionmulti. Let δ ∈ V ′(R). Since
h is surjective, there is β ∈ G such that h(β ) = δ . By induction hypothesis
β ∈V (R). Hence, α ∈V (SunionmultiR). The other case is similar.
2. We define the complexity of a formula as the number of propositional connectives
in the formula. The proof is by induction on the complexity of formulas.
1. There are two basic cases, according to whether φ is a propositional variable
pi ∈ P or φ is of the form may[T ] for some T ∈ ACT . M  pi iffM′  pi is obvious
from definition of surjective, strong homomorphism. Assume M  may[T ]. Then
there is α ∈ V (T ). By part 1 of this lemma, h(α) ∈ V ′(T ). Hence M′  may[T ].
Assume M′  may[T ]. Then there is β ∈ V ′(T ). Since h is surjective, there is
δ ∈ G, such that h(δ ) = β . Hence by part 1 of this lemma, δ ∈V (T ). Therefore,
M  may[T ].
2. Suppose the lemma holds for all formulas of complexity lower than n. Now, let φ
be a formula of complexity n. We consider two cases.
(a) Suppose φ is of the form ¬ψ . Left to right. If M  ¬ψ , then M 2 ψ and hence
M′ 2 ψ (by induction hypothesis) and so M′  ¬ψ , i.e. M′  φ . Right to left.
If M′  ¬ψ , then M′ 2 ψ and hence M 2 ψ (by induction hypothesis) and so
M  ¬ψ .
(b) Suppose φ is of the form ψ ∧ χ . Left to right. If M  ψ ∧ χ , then M  ψ and
M  χ . Hence M′  ψ and M′  χ (by induction hypothesis). So, M′  ψ ∧ χ
i.e. M′  φ . Right to left. If M′ ψ∧χ , then M′ ψ and M′  χ . Hence M ψ
and M  χ (by induction hypothesis). So, M  ψ ∧χ .
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Now we show decidability of satisfiability with a technique used for showing this
for monadic First Order Logic, see e.g. Jeffrey et al. (1997). We prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 If a formula φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a model with a domain
of size at most 2n, where n is the number of basic action type terms occuring in φ .
Proof Let φ be a formula and M = 〈G,V,θ〉 a model such that M  φ . Let S =
{s1, . . . ,sn} be the basic action types occurring in φ , and Q = {q1, . . . ,qm} be the
propositional variables occurring in φ . We first derive the model M′ = 〈G′,V ′,θ ′〉
from M as follows.
1. dom(M′) = dom(M).
2. For any Ti ∈ BT , if Ti ∈ S, then V ′(Ti) =V (Ti). Otherwise V ′(Ti) = /0.
3. For any pi ∈ P, if pi ∈ Q, then θ ′(pi) = T (pi). Otherwise θ ′(pi) = f .
In a sense, M′ is M stripped of all information not pertaining to φ . Since the truth of
φ only depends on its subformulas, an easy inductive argument shows that M′  φ .
Let the signature of an α ∈ dom(M′) be a sequence ( j1, . . . , jn) of 0′s and 1′s,
such that, for each sk ∈ S
1. ji = 1, if α ∈V (sk).
2. ji = 0, if α 6∈V (sk).
There are at most 2n signatures. Call α and β similar, if they have the same signature.
Obviously, similarity is an equivalence relation. For an element α ∈ G′, we use the
notation |α| for the equivalence class C s.t. α ∈C. Now we define N = 〈F,V N ,θN〉
as follows. The domain of N consists of exactly one element from each of the equiv-
alence classes induced by the similarity relation. Hence dom(N) is of size at most 2n.
Further, we define:
Definition 10 1. For each Ti ∈ BT,β ∈ dom(N) ( β ∈V N(Ti) iff β ∈V ′(Ti)).
2. For each pi ∈ P,θN(pi) = θ ′(pi).
We now define a function h, from dom(M′) to dom(N) as follows. For each α ∈
G′,h(α) = δ , where δ ∈ dom(N), and |α| = |δ |. Clearly, there is exactly one such
δ , hence h is a surjective function. Further, by Definition 10 h is a strong homomor-
phism. Hence by Lemma 1, N  φ .
Theorem 2 follows directly from Lemma 2.
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